



The Institution of International Order

Jackson, Simon; O Malley, Alanna

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Rocking on its Hinges? The League of Nations, the United Nations and the New History of Internationalism in the Twentieth Century.

Simon Jackson, University of Birmingham

Alanna O'Malley, Leiden University

When the last remaining servants of the League of Nations (LON), led by Sean Lester, its final Secretary General, arrived at the San Francisco conference in the summer of 1945, belatedly invited by the United States government, they were “given no role and only seats in the last row of the gallery”. Amidst “much evocation of new orders and new worlds”, the main players at the conference scrupulously made “as little mention as possible of the organisation that had gone before”.¹ This act of diplomatic theatre symbolized a wider rupture with the past, ensuring that the nascent United Nations (UN) would not be tarnished by association with its purportedly “failed” predecessor. San Francisco, gleaming on the Pacific, was separated by a wide continent and another ocean from war-ravaged Europe, and particularly from the LON’s cavernous, empty headquarters in Geneva: the founding of the UN was meant to be a hinge, pivoting the world into a new era full of promise.²

In certain respects, it was - and it did. Differences between the League and the UN were pronounced from the outset. The UN, and especially its General Assembly, was fundamentally more representative of peoples and nations than had been the “League of Empires,” to employ Susan Pedersen’s apt term; and it grew far more so as decolonization, in complex partnership with the Cold War, swelled the ranks of the member states.³ The UN also *lacked* certain powers that the League had enjoyed, most noticeably as a result of the introduction of the veto-system in the Security Council. But despite these major changes the UN also quietly assimilated – often in

ways artfully hidden from the global public's view - many of the LON's organisations and experts. It built on their work in a range of "technical" (though still eminently political) areas, from healthcare to social and economic development policies, through institutions such as the reformed World Health Organization and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).⁴

Historians have long chronicled the UN's rise from the ashes of World War II, yielding a spectrum of conclusions from the laudatory and teleological to the critical and disaggregating.⁵

Across that spectrum, however, many of them have shared a view of the League as a salutary failure, the indispensable political counterpoint and analytical premise of the UN's rise. This failure is habitually sketched in a brisk opening panorama peopled with Klemens Von Metternich, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Woodrow Wilson, Aristide Briand and Adolf Hitler, before the author turns to a portrait of the post-1945 dawn.⁶ Karl Polanyi wrote, for example, that "In vain did Geneva look toward the restoration of such a [balance of power] system in an enlarged and improved Concert of Europe called the League of Nations; in vain were facilities for consultation and joint action provided in the Covenant of the League, for the essential precondition of independent power units was now lacking".⁷ Only in the last decade have historians gone back to the LON, asking not why it failed — and by implication why the UN "succeeded," or might yet succeed — but *how* the League worked, and what legacies its machinery, its personnel, and its global audience inspired.⁸ This book's contributors advance through the breaches in older historiography engineered by those scholars and our debt to them is manifest. But by pooling expertise on a variety of themes, periods and geographies we can offer a view of the League and the UN from a far wider variety of standpoints and across a broader chronology than any single historian might hope to. The overall effect is not merely to supplement the new international history of the League and the UN with a bestiary of additional

case studies, but to globalise it methodologically, offering what Susan Pedersen in her foreword to this volume calls a “multi-local” grasp of liberal internationalism at work around the world.

We deliver this across the approximate period from the 1920s to the 1970s, the long moment of the rise of the nation-state as a dominant political form worldwide, while also dropping periodically back into the late nineteenth century in order to appraise the legacies of the “first age of globalization” and note the influence of the burgeoning, self-consciously “new internationalism” characteristic of that era.⁹ Ranging primarily, then, from the “Wilsonian Moment” after World War I to the conjuncture of the Helsinki Accords and the twin rise of human rights and neo-liberalism in the 1970s, the book nuances and contextualises the hallowed rupture of “Year Zero,” 1945, rather than dwelling exclusively on and singularising that moment.¹⁰ As a whole the essays thereby provide both a panorama of the two institutions across the twentieth century and a core focus on the continuities and disjunctures between the League and UN. At the level of the institutions themselves, one result is to respond to Andrew Webster’s inviting comment on a key recent monograph on the League that “it would have been intriguing to track at greater length some of the currents running from [the] League to United Nations. The precedents, procedures, and indeed very people involved with the governance of mandates did not disappear with the end of the League itself. On the contrary they explicitly informed what came next”.¹¹

More widely, the result of the book’s chronology is a significant nuancing of the naturalized binaries historians have piled onto that broad-shouldered year, 1945: empire versus the nation-state, (anti)-Fascism versus the Cold War, racial-civilizational hierarchy versus developmental-economic hierarchy, and group-based rights claims versus individual rights claims.¹² In this way

we contribute to a wider debate on the periodization of the twentieth century stimulated by the growth of global histories of empire as a political formation, which often end in 1945.¹³ We also challenge other chronological patterns, such as Charles S. Maier's influential analysis of the two post war moments of 1918 and 1945 in terms of embedded liberalism; a paradigm still entrenched in international history and international relations (IR).¹⁴

Indeed, in the neighbouring discipline of IR we hope more generally to refigure the ways in which constructivist, post-structuralist, critical and historically minded IR scholars conceive of international institutions, by providing a bridge to the new international history, one supported by a solid span of case studies. We hope thereby to foster a more sustained and mutually beneficial exchange between the fields. IR scholars of varied theoretical allegiance, from Robert Cox and Martha Finnemore to John Ikenberry and Thomas Weiss, have long analysed the ways in which institutions contribute to the construction of international norms and global orders, while debate on the nature of international organisations has regularly divided such noted structural realists as John J. Mearsheimer from such broadly liberal internationalists as Anne-Marie Slaughter.¹⁵ Exponents of more global approaches to IR, meanwhile, have increasingly deployed historical approaches to focus on bloc politics, smaller states and civil society actors, and, as in the case of Amitav Acharya for example, have emphasized the importance of non-Western theories and regional specificities.¹⁶ The essays below will nourish such approaches, helping to reframe and more thoroughly historicize views of the LON and the UN and the ways they shaped the international order. For instance, they bring into focus not just how institutions changed as bureaucracies but also how international practices relating to the end of empire, nation-building in the postcolonial world and the creation of rights regimes evolved. As part of this process, many of the chapters tease out specific visions of how institutions worked

simultaneously as negotiated platforms, forums for debate and in some cases, agents themselves. Nathan Kurz's incisive study of petitioning of the League and UN, for example, offers a new interpretation of the international legal system at mid-century by positioning the LON and UN athwart locally specific yet internationally resonant strands of political reason.

We thereby challenge IR scholars to far more granular historicizing of how institutions work and how they effected and continue to effect change in both state policies and broader cultures of the "international." Instead of playing off the varying schools of thought against each other, we encourage critical and positivist IR theorists alike to deliberate more historically and in more fully achieved context on the dynamic role that these organisations have played in relation to broader internationalisms across time. It is argued in many of the chapters below that internationalism was far more than the product of what global institutions like the UN or LON did centrally in New York and Geneva, or how they funnelled or shaped the sovereign power of empires and nation-states. Rather, internationalism in this volume includes regional cooperation, non-state activism, the rise of international civil society and the global dialogue between local, subaltern protagonists and the international visions of the elites. As the case studies show, all this sustained an array of different types and forms of internationalism, and thus offers plentiful resources to IR scholars who have long moved past static categories of analysis such as "development" and "modernity." In undercutting the telos of such logics, the book furnishes, to take George Lawson's terms, different "context[s] and narrative[s]" of internationalism, but it also sharpens and refreshes modes of enquiry based on the social scientific staples of "eventfulness and ideal-typification".¹⁷

Across the watershed of 1945, then, the essays examine the evolution of internationalist ideas,

institutions and practices at — and between — the League and UN. The essays make their arguments through empirical research on fields of internationalist activity from political strategy to economic development, from international law to practices of rights, and from humanitarianism to the changing forms of empire. Changes in internationalist thought and technocracy are thereby appraised in contexts such as the re-constitution of political identity in the Middle East or the imperial use of forced labour. Overall, we show how the LON and UN both *shaped* and *were shaped by* global internationalisms, in the rich variety of its protagonists — liberals, socialists, Fascists and Communists all engaged with the League and UN through national representation and through intersecting international organisations, we should note — and the grinding tectonics of its norms.¹⁸

Crucially, the book takes this approach not just from the habitual “centres” of League and UN politics, the fetishized *lieux de mémoire* of Geneva, New York or Bretton Woods, where the clacking of secretariat typewriters echoed against the carved wheat sheaves of prosperity foretold, but from a global, multi-local perspective.¹⁹ We do not neglect the importance of the politicians and diplomats who strode the stage in the Palais des Nations in Geneva or at the UN Headquarters in Manhattan, or ignore the administrative and technocratic bureaucracies that operated the scenery and drafted the scripts.²⁰ But our central argument is that although the LON and UN shaped internationalism from the centre, as political proscenia, technocratic clearing houses and vehicles for world ordering, they were just as powerfully moulded by internationalisms that welled up globally, far beyond the main stages of Geneva and New York City.²¹ As such, the history of internationalism at and between the League and UN must be grasped as much in Japan and Argentina, for example, as in Geneva and Manhattan. Indeed, as historians including Meredith Terretta and José Antonio Sánchez Román argue, the prisons of

West Africa or the banks of the Amazon and Tigris were places just as “international,” and quite as constitutive of “internationalism,” as the smoke-filled committee rooms and champagne-oiled assemblies overlooking Lac Lemman or the East River.²²

To give an example, Nova Robinson’s essay in this book, on international women’s rights from 1920-1953, opens at a typical League event – a pre-Assembly reception in Geneva that included a keynote by Maria Vérone, a leading French advocate of women’s rights, and that likely also featured the popping of champagne corks, the massed “artillery of the League of Nations”.²³ But crucially, Robinson also weaves into her account the campaigns of the General Oriental Feminist Alliance, a regional Arab women’s organisation based in Syria, and appraises the January 1931 gathering, in Lahore, of the All Asian Women’s Conference. By bringing the delegates at Lahore into analytical conversation with the delegates who saw Vérone at her Swiss podium, Robinson shows how the internationalist “spirit of Geneva” was partly made in the Punjab. In doing so she also warns international historians against reproducing, in the balance of their research, those hierarchies and exclusions that structured the cast and made the stars of the cacophonous, long-running performances in Geneva and New York City.²⁴ Likewise, Konrad Lawson’s study of the visions for world federalism conjured in the ruins of defeat by Japanese politician-writers Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko shows how the global re-ordering that took place after 1945 must be grasped not just at San Francisco or Bretton Woods. Instead, Lawson shows how the discussions and disappointments of San Francisco, for example, reverberated in East Asia, and catalysed the transformation of older social and geopolitical ideas for use in Japanese post-war society.

As noted above and as the geographical and archival diversity of these examples suggests, the strength of a collective volume lies in its ability to “allow various specialists to enter into a

broader dialogue while addressing specific, common themes”.²⁵ Methodologically, meanwhile, the wider scope of a collective analysis allows for a blend of the insights of de-centred ethnography, lately exemplified by Lori Allen’s recent work on human rights practices in Palestine, with wide-angled views on the spatially expansive institutional cultures of internationalism, as in the work of Anne-Isabelle Richard, Helen McCarthy and Glenda Sluga on the associational infrastructure of the League, and finally with political studies of the dynamics in play on the central stages of Geneva and Manhattan.²⁶

Accordingly, the essays that follow together construct a multi-scalar, dialogical, and fine-grained historical analysis of the role of international organisations as they shaped and were shaped by internationalism across the twentieth century. They present an exceptionally wide — though not comprehensive — ensemble of actors, stretching across class hierarchies and racialized geographies, and they show how the interactions of those actors tested the limits of the League and UN as international institutions, and developed internationalism as a variegated, global practice.

For international historians and students of international relations the consequences of this argument are significant, since they mandate a critical re-engagement with area studies, global history and social history, and with a variety of sources far beyond the holdings of the international organisations themselves. For if the appeal of the League and UN archives has consisted in their apparent convocation of the world’s opinions and petitions under one roof, and perhaps in their translation of that polyglot clamour into English and French, the idea that the overlapping internationalism of the two international organisations welled up at the margins quite as much as it was made at the centre challenges the epistemological hegemony of those documents.²⁷ As Terretta has aptly noted of the new wave of human rights histories — in a

manner applicable to the wider historiography on internationalism and international institutions — they have generally excluded “the narrative accounts of grassroots activists in favour of official state documents, UN resolutions, or the letters, speeches, and writings of elected office-holders, UN representatives, and colonial administrators ... But how far can we go ... without contextualizing the particular settings in which human rights discourses were invoked?”²⁸ In the case of international organisations such as the League and the UN, meeting this challenge will require international historians to travel further, learn more languages, and above all to collaborate more systematically in order to capture the meanings and practices of internationalism at the LON and the UN.²⁹ This volume takes a step in that direction.

Efforts to institutionalize the management of the world order have a history as old as the exercise of imperial power. Moreover, the narrower process of institutionalization has frequently been accompanied by the attempts of legislators, national states and varyingly mediated global publics to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and cultural force field.³⁰ From the Magna Carta to the Diet of Worms, and from the Hague Conventions on International Law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the geopolitical clearing houses built at the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, collective strategies to create and govern a system of international relations, and to develop legally binding agreements in order to realize a specific vision of world order, have underpinned a variety of systems of what we now refer to as global governance.³¹ In the litany of institutions that have shaped international relations and their interpenetrated norms and cultures, however, the League and the UN are distinguished, as Glenda Sluga has lately noted, by their emergence within global wars of unprecedented scale and destructiveness.³² The League slowly took shape in the years around

1920, following the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, while the United Nations came into being, as we saw above, during the post-World War II moment around 1945, an extension of the alliance that had defeated the Axis Powers. But while both institutions were forged during wartime, each developed its own visions for how to manage peacetime relations, facilitate social progress and resolve international security dilemmas, due in part to the wider context and deeper roots of their respective eras. Nathan Kurz's essay in this volume, for example, on Jewish NGOs in the late 1940s, shows how numerous protagonists at the UN, many of whom had worked for or in contact with the League, set out to create, interpret, and disseminate various narratives of its operation in the 1930s so as to justify specific policies after 1945. We must therefore acknowledge both institutions as distinct regimes of global governance, specific centres of their respective internationalist force fields, the character of which is legitimately open to historical interpretation in isolation. But as Kurz's work neatly illustrates, we must *also* see the LON and UN as a single, interpenetrated, and temporally layered whole, whose empirical global history is indispensable to that work of exegesis, and is only now being written.³³

Based on the famous "Fourteen Points" outlined in January 1918 by the American President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations came into being as an instrument with which to manage international security crises, and crucially, to keep the power of Germany and other aggressor states in check following World War I. Wilson presented his "Fourteen Points" as a series of edicts about how the imperial world system would be reformed, and how relations between states would henceforth be managed; its often vague premises were elaborated, mitigated and reworked at the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919. The Covenant of the League was its governing charter and statement of purpose, and was drawn up by Wilson and his advisors in

contentious collaboration with the victorious allied powers, dominated by Great Britain and France. It was an effort to realize many of the Wilsonian principles, setting out policies supposed to prevent another world war. The Covenant therefore proposed a series of security measures, including disarmament and the use of arbitration to settle international disputes.³⁴ It also contained a list of treaties on a variety of related technical and social issues, from drug and human trafficking to global health initiatives and labour conditions, and two geopolitical management systems that acted to “adjudicate relations of sovereignty”: protection of minorities, mainly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and administration of former subjects of the Central Powers in the Mandated territories, scattered through the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific.³⁵

The LON’s birth in the mirrored delivery room of Versailles meant that it was dominated by the victors: of its fifty or so member states, Germany joined only in 1926 and left again seven years later, the USA never joined at all, and the Soviet Union joined only in 1934. Despite this, the League was never simply a tool of Britain and France. Having survived its formal abandonment by the USA (informal American involvement continued, notably on trade), it became an ungovernable theatre for international publicity and norm-making in the 1920s. Increasingly, especially in the 1930s, it also became a factory of influential technocratic knowledge production, as in the case of the economic and financial activities lately documented by Patricia Clavin and Jamie Martin.³⁶ Overall, as Susan Pedersen has convincingly argued, what was most important about the League was its role as a public platform, managed by an international bureaucracy of technicians and experts, on which individuals, other international organisations, and nations-in-the-making or possessed of qualified sovereignty, could air their views and petitions, and find an audience.

Turning to the UN, as preparations began in earnest for a new international organisation even

before World War II concluded, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen — as noted above — to avoid any association with the tarnished image of the LON. The United Nations was received in San Francisco with fanfare from the war-weary international public, and was greeted especially enthusiastically in the Global South, where it appeared initially as a crowbar to break down the imperial system. From its inception therefore, the new organisation did not just protect the interests of the Western powers (though those powers worked hard in that direction), but again became an important platform and a mechanism through which the international visions of other actors were amplified and heard. Advocates for decolonization, civil rights activists and a range of other groups objecting to imperial practices tried to make use of the UN platform. One such example was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led by American sociologist and activist W.E.B Du Bois, who seized upon the organisation as a means by which to pursue his agenda for civil rights.³⁷ The San Francisco planners' announcement of a new era of universal ideals was music to the ears of the beleaguered societies still living under imperial or mandated rule, to the nationalist aspirations of their future leaders under the colonial yoke, but also to the nascent international anti-colonial movement that would radically impact the UN in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the more truly representative structure of the new organisation was lauded as a platform for discourses about rights, the universalizing of human rights and the deconstruction of the racist, imperialist liberal international order.

As the organisation developed through the 1950s and 1960s it was particularly shaped by the visions and ambitions of anti-colonial actors who sought to implement and realize the principles enshrined in the Charter by creating, through the UN, mechanisms, tools and policies designed to end colonial empire and imperialism through formal means. The successes of the decolonization

process can thus be partly attributed to the role of newly-independent states lobbying in the chambers of the Security Council and the General Assembly for a shift in norms of imperial politics, and to their invigoration of the unrealised potential of the Charter.³⁸ During these same years, the visionary Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld adopted an interventionist approach to international politics, empowering his office with the support of the anti-colonial lobby and driving the anti-colonial agenda forward.³⁹ In the process, he helped to activate the agency of the UN, positioning it as a peacekeeping organisation, a neutral arbiter between states and as a monitor of peace settlements - from the Suez Canal in 1956 to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Building on these achievements, through the 1970s and the 1980s the UN developed as much more than a “Parliament of Man” paralyzed by the hard realities of Cold War politics. From asserting the rights of states to control their natural resources, to efforts to reshape the international economic order, through to the development of a myriad of human rights and the expansion of forms and expressions of developmental practice through the 1970s and the 1980s, internationalism became increasingly various and visible.⁴⁰ The end of the Cold War and the resurgence of interest in the UN as a means of managing international conflicts led to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. Out of these experiences, both positive and negative, emerged the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” which, though increasingly questioned, continues to define how the international community approaches questions of intervention, protection of citizens and conflict resolution. The UN remains at the centre of a wide array of debates on how to manage international relations, development, humanitarianism, social and economic equality, environmental problems and international security dilemmas.

In sum, both the League and the United Nations operated not as unified actors, but rather as “platforms” for both formalizing and splintering political ideas and international norms, and as laboratories and toolkits of legal and technical procedures. Those procedures were used to generate new types of dissidence locally, with which to then return to the fray on the “platforms” of Geneva and New York.⁴¹

How, then, did the League and the UN effect change - and in relation to which forms of global internationalism - during the shift from a world of empires to one of nation-states? Although the chapters that follow inter-connect in a rich variety of ways, we have placed them into three broad thematic sections, the first focused on the production of norms, the second on the development of expertise and the third on the global re-ordering of empire through the League and UN. In each section the emphasis on the differences and inter-connections between the League and the UN, and on a multi-local and global perspective, remain constant.

In the opening section, both institutions are viewed as arenas in which new international norms were produced through the connection of global, multi-local networks with the increasingly representative national memberships of the League and UN. Building on Susan Pedersen’s sustained focus on the League as a generator of new international norms, three chapters trace the patterns of local interaction with the League and UN that shaped norm construction in the crucial realms of human rights and national economic and political sovereignty. Both institutions, the chapters show, served to collate and broker norms, gradually codifying these shifts into recognized but non-binding international norms, or in some cases into international law. Nevertheless, as Aurélie Élisabeth Gfeller has lately emphasised, even norms produced within

hierarchical and Eurocentric international organisations are marked by “specific, locally rooted dynamics” and by the efforts of a globally diverse set of “norm entrepreneurs”.⁴²

Illustrating this interplay of global, multi-local dynamics and the collating work of the League and UN, Andrew Arsan contextualizes the role of the Lebanese diplomat and scholar Charles Malik in shaping human rights norms. Malik is seen in numerous accounts as a figure of the UN “centre” *par excellence*, carved out alongside the likes of René Cassin as a founding father of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.⁴³ While acknowledging Malik’s central role in the committees of the early UN, Arsan shows how his allegiance to Heideggerian thought and his long steeping in the traditions of Lebanese national particularism means we must see neither Malik, nor the norms of human rights he helped elaborate, as examples of “conventional” post-1945 internationalism, even to the degree postulated in the revisionist accounts, such as Samuel Moyn’s, that have lately downplayed the salience of human rights in the 1940s.⁴⁴ Instead, Arsan argues we must recognize the irreconcilably tangled multiplicity and specificity that informed Malik’s critique of the sovereign nation state as the basis of internationalism. In doing so we may better come to terms with the powerful Middle Eastern and League-era influences on the elaboration of the universalist UN human rights regime.

José Antonio Sánchez Román, meanwhile, focusing on norms of economic sovereignty, outlines the emergence, well before the fabled era of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1940s, of a “new, unevenly and intermittently unified global periphery”, including Brazil, Romania and Iran, in the LON’s technical economic meetings of the 1920s.⁴⁵ By focusing on the politics of fluvial trade, shipping, and the international taxation of imperial big business in the 1920s, Román shows that while norms of economic sovereignty crystallised at League meetings in Geneva, Brussels and Barcelona, they did so in part through

the creation of new connections between, for example, Brazil, Iran and British Mandate Iraq on river navigation, or between Argentina and South Africa on monetary policy.⁴⁶ Drawing on several Argentinian and Brazilian archives, and marrying business history with global intellectual history to remarkable effect, Román also shows how Latin American jurists, such as the Venezuelan Federico Álvarez Feo, fought against the recycling at the League of nineteenth century imperial legal practices of extraterritoriality, and against influential business lobbies' use of a "free trade" economic vulgate to camouflage their monopoly power. As Feo proclaimed, arguing that the League committee for double taxation should investigate foreign utility companies gouging citizens of Latin American states: "the law of supply and demand does not work in many South American countries." Feo's assertion, Román demonstrates, was an early instance of the wider and longer-term Latin American attempt to refuse the concept of "backwardness" between roughly 1920 and 1980, and to work through the League and UN to reshape economic sovereignty accordingly.

The illumination provided by a "de-centred" Latin American perspective on the international order recurs in Mats Ingulstad's and Lucas Lixinski's chapter on Pan-Americanism at the League and UN. They show how the international politics of empire and decolonization, as they emerged in Geneva and subsequently in New York, were powerfully affected not just by the European empires' self-preservation instincts, as influentially described by Mark Mazower, but by norms of regional and hemispheric internationalism with roots in the Latin-American nineteenth century. Latin-American states' experience with the Monroe Doctrine, which underpinned the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, informed their approach to both the LON Covenant and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VIII (on regional arrangements) of

the latter were particularly influenced by Latin American perspectives.⁴⁷ As Jesús-María Yepes, a Colombian jurist and successively a delegate to the LON Assembly, the wartime Pan-American conferences and the 1945 San Francisco conference put it: “the Republics of the New World, whose spirit of international collaboration is well known, did not want to abandon a regional system that was well organized and had proved its mettle, in favour of another, universalist system whose efficiency had not yet been proven ... the Charter of the United Nations therefore implies no derogation to the Pan-American system”.⁴⁸ Consequently, on issues such as dispute arbitration and non-intervention, Latin Americans toggled ceaselessly, generally by means of international law and lawyers, between the successive regional and global scales of internationalism on offer, in the pursuit of a more resilient and complete mode of national sovereignty.

By tracing the evolution of these norms of human rights, economic and national sovereignty as they welled up in the Middle East and Latin America as much as in Geneva and New York, the first section characterizes the League and the UN as networked political forges, where international norms were catalysed, collated and legitimized.

As Martha Finnemore has suggested, norms can be characterised by their recognition as such by a community of actors, and by their ability to make claims of varying force on the behaviour of those actors.⁴⁹ As such, norms at the League and UN became entrenched and increasingly able to circulate in part through their performance by specific actors, who in doing so not only defined fields and problems and produced medical or jurisprudential knowledge, for instance, but who often sought their own consecration as experts.⁵⁰ But such consecration always relied on the intersecting and institutionalised operation of other dynamics, notably those of race, class and

gender: many claimed expertise, in other words, but the claims of white, male Europeans were often facilitated and privileged.⁵¹ In the second section, therefore, three chapters dealing with individual petitioning, humanitarian relief and women's rights show how experts of varying sorts and varying success emerged in circulation between the central secretariats of the League and the UN, an evolving constellation of sub-agencies and an orbiting set of philanthropic foundations, non-governmental associations and grass-roots activists. Here too, the simultaneously distinct and interlinked character of the League and the UN comes to the fore, and the importance of global, multi-local nodes of claims to expertise remains constant.

Nathan Kurz's chapter on individual petitioning at the League and UN shows how the legal vocabulary of petitioning the two institutions, and the procedures devised as part of the respective processes, made it possible for individuals to test the legitimacy of the international order and seek to shape it through their development of grassroots international legal expertise. Shifting between the interwar politics of the 1933 Bernheim Petition to the LON, made in defence of Central European minority rights threatened by Nazism, and the later activities of Jewish NGOs lobbying the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Kurz dissects the complex interrelationship between the two institutions.⁵² Drawing on innovative sources including television talk shows, and concentrating on the practical and social legal politics of rights rather than simply on the intellectual politics of abstract categories in the thought of major theorists, he shows how petitioning allowed local experience to be crafted into international expertise, and how post-1945 Jewish activists retrospectively reconstructed the Bernheim Petition in the service of their goal to universalize minority rights.

Florian Hannig's chapter examines another sphere of expertise at the other end of our chronological range, as he shows how the UN's permanent and expansive role in the system of humanitarian aid expertise had its origins in UN planners' interpretation of the LON's record, but fully crystallized only in the 1970s. Moving the history of international humanitarianism away from the UN centre in New York, Hannig positions the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971 as the moment at which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) definitively came to the fore, coordinating some ten million refugees through a hugely expanded budget and also contributing to the establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Fund and the development of the World Food Programme (WFP). Hannig identifies three broad phases that led to this moment. First came the years from 1943-1951, when deliberately temporary UN expedients, responding to the LON's perceived track record, sought to alleviate post-World War II suffering, largely in Europe. Second was the period 1949-1970, the era of the high Cold War and of national sovereignty-focused decolonization, when ad-hoc agencies with a limited mandate responded to specific crises such as the Agadir earthquake of 1960 in Morocco, or the displacement occasioned by the close of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962, while the permanent UN agencies concentrated on economic development. Finally, Hannig analyses the period since 1971, as the UN created a durable, global humanitarian relief regime. His chapter illuminates how the 1930s and 1970s were both decades of growing expert technocracy at the LON and the UN respectively, and how both decades saw waves of new geopolitical multipolarity that pushed states, including the USA, to re-envision their relationship with international organisations. Against this backdrop Hannig emphasizes how in the post-Biafra climate of public opinion, and thanks to contingencies including Pakistan's exclusion of the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR stepped into the breach in 1971, part of the wider rise of human rights politics in that decade.⁵³

Finally, Nova Robinson's chapter on the Liaison Committee of International Women's Organizations (LCIWO) and the Origins of an International Women's Convention similarly explores the role of the League and the UN in the contentious, multi-local development of expertise, this time in the service of women's rights, and again shows how the two institutions also helped to re-produce raced, classed and gendered exclusions - even within campaigns for legal equality. As a representative to the LON and UN for a long list of national women's rights organisations, the LCIWO created a repertoire of publicity tactics and juridical arguments in seeking to make the international sphere deliver formal legal equality for women around the world, as the culmination of decades of struggle. Based on expert studies, and yet pushing to expand and challenge the often male-dominated definition of legitimate expertise, LCIWO activists felt an international treaty could then be used to pressure recalcitrant national governments to enforce rules on equality between the sexes in a range of areas. But the largely North Atlantic and middle class membership of the LCIWO – the same women who have generally been the subject of scholarship on this question to date - substantially excluded the concerns and demands of women in the colonial world.⁵⁴ Far from accepting this marginalization, women in the colonial world organized and fought to make their own claims heard, to force the acknowledgement of their own knowledge as expert, and to place their own representatives, such as the Ottoman and then Lebanese women's activist Nour Hamada (1897-1963), at the heart of the debate. As Robinson shows in her trail-blazing work, the women of the colonized world must be brought fully into this history, not least because the hierarchy of legitimate expertise established at their expense at the League would strongly influence precisely

who participated in the post-1945 international debate on women's rights at the UN, right through to the 1970s.

Overall, this section shows how the members of the central secretariats and adjunct agencies of the League and the UN, in dialogue with a wide range of non-governmental groups and social movements welling up around the world, helped to bring key issues to the attention of international society. But more than that, it shows how numerous internationalist actors worked to make the LON and UN sites for the production of knowledge and claiming of expertise that would bring about change.

If the slow transition from the world of empires that ushered in the League to the world of nation-states that the UN helped to constitute is a central context for the first two sections' discussions of norms and expertise, in its final section the book takes a wide-angled and more direct view of how the League and the UN acted as crucibles for the political transformation of imperial formations in the Middle East, East Asia and Africa. Chapters in this section reveal the different visions of North-South and East-West relations mediated by the League and UN, and highlight the ways in which the two international institutions sponsored the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism even as they recycled the dynamics and transmitted the legacies of imperial rule.⁵⁵ These chapters' primary deployment of local and imperial frames of analysis serves to identify crucial wider contexts in which the League and the UN exercised their influence and in which they were also shaped by a wide spectrum of interpretations of liberal internationalism that bubbled up in Lisbon, Tokyo, Ankara or Damascus.

Sarah Shields' study of "consociational politics" accordingly starts from two local cases: the Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta/Iskenderun, in the north of French Mandate Syria, and the

earlier case of the city of Mosul, in British Mandate Iraq. Through a close analysis of the way the League mediated the Turkish-French dispute over Alexandretta (or Hatay) in 1936 and the Turkish-British conflict over Mosul in 1925, Shields shows how the Wilsonian logic of sovereignty, based on popular consent, led to an essentialist - and essentialising - quest to categorize individuals as part of religious “communities,” whether majority or minority.⁵⁶ Since the political balance of representation in Alexandretta and Mosul, and consequently the territorial fate of the two regions, was to be indexed to the size of each “community,” voter registration processes became politically pivotal. These processes forged political identities and constitutional facts in a frantic atmosphere of ultra-instrumentalised historical and sociological claim-making. Shields shows how even though individual LON missions to Mosul returned with changed assumptions about the possibility of even allocating “communal identity,” let alone basing political preferences on it, governments in Ankara, Damascus and Beirut all bought into the notion that the ethnic, religious or linguistic identity of the governed could be singularised and would necessarily determine the political preferences of individuals and groups. National governments then used that flawed premise to build irredentist diplomatic and publicity campaigns focused on the League. Shields then expands her argument into the UN era, examining the subsequent trajectory of consociationalism as a paradigm in post-1945 political science and explains the ways in which the UN staged the distillation and distribution of this paradigm of representation into the constitutional arrangements of newly independent and developing countries. She closes with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, and the body blow dealt to the Iraqi nation state in the aftermath by the US imposition of a consociational set of political arrangements based on hazy assumptions about the meaning of religious community.

Konrad Lawson's chapter takes up another context of global re-ordering against a backdrop of US military offensive, this time in East Asia at the time of the UN's birth. Lawson recovers the surge of creative transnational idealism that characterized the 1940s by focusing on post-war Japanese calls for various forms of world federalism. These calls were prompted both by the experience of World War II and the atom bomb, but also by interwar ideas for regional and world organisation in Japan, which had reached a climax with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere announced in 1940.⁵⁷ Lawson delivers a close reading of the way two key figures in Japanese politics – Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko – responded to the context of defeat in 1945 and the potential of global internationalism in its aftermath. He shows for example how Kagawa Toyohiko, a Christian evangelist, cooperativist and social activist, despite his equivocal wartime support for the Japanese expansion into Asia, pivoted in 1945 to describe the San Francisco conference of that year as merely the first step in the creation of a genuine “world state” (*sekai kokka*). By demonstrating how both thinkers drew on decades of intellectual and political experimentation in Japan to criticise the League and the UN as merely the first step to a more desirable world federation, Lawson documents how the two international institutions acted as a catalyst for post-imperial dynamics far from Geneva and New York City.

Finally, in a chapter spanning the years 1919-1962, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro cap the book by appraising the impact of the League and UN on another imperial formation, the Portuguese Empire in Africa, and specifically on the politics of forced labour. Forced labour was an elemental aspect of the politics of colonial social hierarchy in colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, and indispensable to the century-long series of projects to revivify Portuguese Empire through the creation of “new Brazils in Africa.” In a trio of case

studies – after World War I and World War II and finally in 1957-1962, closing with the abolition of the dual labour regime – the authors explore ways in which engagement with the League and the UN, and with transnational modes of publicity and NGOs, forced the Portuguese Empire to rethink and internally scrutinize its policies on forced labour even as it stumbled on as a political formation into the 1970s.

Ultimately this book offers a multi-local and global perspective on internationalism, explicitly connecting the League and the UN while simultaneously outlining their differences, and emphasizing the influence on them of movements and powers that welled up around the world, far from Geneva and New York, yet in dialogue with those main stages. In doing so it reveals the inescapable complexity and diversity of internationalisms, from the visions of Charles Malik to the tireless activism of Nour Hamada, and from the Portuguese colonial administration wrestling with the Ghanaian government via the International Labor Organization to the efforts of Latin American states to bring their influence to bear on the international order. We hope that by outlining a more global approach to twentieth century internationalism – encompassing forces that sprang up in South and East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe as well as the North Atlantic West – and by treating the League and UN as both individual entities and as an interconnected and conjoined whole, we will encourage further research along these lines. Such research will mingle international institutional perspectives with a serious engagement with local socio-cultural histories, national views and regional ideas about world order, based on archives and secondary historiographies in a wider variety of languages. It will certainly be a collaborative endeavour. Ceaselessly shaped by movements bubbling up from the outside, the League and the UN emerge in the essays that follow as networked platforms,

effective instruments and sometimes agents through which internationalism changed across the twentieth century.

¹ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 397.

² On symbolic theatre and diplomacy see Naoko Shimanzu, “Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955,” *Modern Asian Studies* 48 (2014): 225-252. On San Francisco see Stephen Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World: America's Embrace of World Leadership in World War II” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015); Patrick Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II* (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2002); Mark Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea*, (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Christopher O’Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

³ Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Christopher J. Lee (ed.), *Making a World after Empire: the Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2010); Patricia Clavin and Glenda Sluga (eds.), *Internationalisms, A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁴ David Ekbladh, “American Asylum: The United States and the Campaign to Transplant the Technical League, 1939–1940,” *Diplomatic History* 39, (2015): 629–60; Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 267-297.

⁵ Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN, an Unfinished Journey* (Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press, 2010); Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: The UN’s Roles in International Society since 1945,’ in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World, The UN’s Roles in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Akira Iriye, *Global Community, The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Paul Kennedy, *Parliament of Man, The United Nations and the Quest for World Government* (London: Allen Lane, 2007); Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

⁶ For an example, among many, of 1945 as an assumed watershed see Robert J. McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) and Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith* (London, ZED Books, 2005).

⁷ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press 2001), 22.

⁸ Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*; Ryan M. Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," *American Historical Review* 112 (2007): 1091–111; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Glenda Sluga and Sunil Amrith, "New Histories of the U.N.," *Journal of World History* 19 (2008): 251-274.

⁹ On the nation state see Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, 126-152; on self-consciousness see Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, "Rethinking the History of Internationalism" in Sluga and Clavin, *Internationalism*, 4-5. On the first age of globalization see Quinn Slobodian, "How to See the World Economy: Statistics, Maps, and Schumpeter's Camera in the First Age of Globalization," *Journal of Global History* 10 (2015): 307–32.

¹⁰ For an example of an approach to a pivotal year see Leela Gandhi and Deborah L. Nelson, "Editors' Introduction," *Critical Inquiry* 40, 4 'Around 1948: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Global Transformation' (2014): 285-297. On the twin utopias of the 1970s see among an exploding literature Mary Nolan, "Utopian Visions in a Post Utopian Era: Americanism, Human Rights, and Market Fundamentalism," *Central European History* 44 (2011): 13-36; Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹¹ Andrew Webster, "Review of *The Guardians* by Susan Pedersen," H-Diplo Roundtable Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (2016), 26, accessed May 4, 2017, <http://www.tiny.cc/Roundtable-XVIII-2>.

¹² For examples of previous studies that effectively straddle the divide of 1945 see Maria Letícia Galluzzi Bizzo, "Agências internacionais e agenda local: atores e idéias na interlocução entre nutrição e país (1932-1964)" (PhD diss., Casa de Oswaldo Cruz/Fiocruz, 2012) and Sunil S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-1965* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006).

¹³ On the historiographical problem of the global twentieth century see Manu Goswami, Gabrielle Hecht, Adeeb Khalid, Anna Krylova, Elizabeth F. Thompson, Jonathan R. Zatlin, Andrew Zimmerman; "AHR Conversation:

History after the End of History: Reconceptualizing the Twentieth Century” *American Historical Review* 121, 5 (2016), 1567-1607; Stephen Wertheim, “Review of Essays on Twentieth Century History,” *New Global Studies* 5 (2011); Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 807-31.

¹⁴ On empire Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004); Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Emily S. Rosenberg, (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870-1945* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012); Steven Topik, *Global Markets Transformed: 1870-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010). For Maier’s paradigm see Charles S. Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review* 86 (1981): 327–352 and relatedly in IR see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). For more on 1945 as a caesura see *inter alia* Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel and Corinna Unger (eds.) *International Organizations and Development, 1945-1990* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Cornelia Navari, *Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2000); Iriye, *Global Community*; Bob Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations: from 1815 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2009); Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij and Thomas Weiss (eds.), *UN Ideas that Changed the World* (Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press, 2009); Madeleine Herren, *Geschichte der Internationalen Organisation* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009).

¹⁵ We thank Dr. Adam Bower and Dr. Camilla Macdonald for very helpful discussions and comments on the interface of IR and international history. See for a sample of approaches in a huge literature Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the world: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52 (1998): 887- 917; Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993); Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of*

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¹⁶ Amitav Acharya, *Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR?* (Routledge, 2014); Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹⁷ George Lawson, "The eternal divide? History and International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, 2 (2010): 206.

¹⁸ For a discussion of socialist and Communist internationalism see for example Daniel Laqua, "Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism," *Contemporary European History* 24, 2 (2015), 175-192; Sandrine Kott, "Par-delà la guerre froide: les organisations internationales et les circulations Est-Ouest (1947-1973)," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 109, numéro spécial "Le bloc de l'Est en question" dirigé par Justine Faure et Sandrine Kott (2011): 143-154; Celia Donert, "From Communist Internationalism to Human Rights: Gender, Violence and International Law in the Women's International Democratic Federation Mission to North Korea, 1951," *Contemporary European History* 25, 2 (2016): 313-333; Serge Wolikow, *Histoire de la L'Internationale communiste – le rêve déchu de la révolution mondiale* (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2010); Patrizia Dogliani, "The Fate of Socialist Internationalism," in Sluga and Clavin, *Internationalism*, 38-61.

¹⁹ For a recent primer on global approaches see Diego Adrián Olstein, *Thinking History Globally* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

²⁰ Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Carolyn Biltoft, "Speaking the Peace: Language, World Politics and the League of Nations, 1918-1935" Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. (Princeton University, 2010); Jo-Anne Pemberton, "New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity," *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 311-336; Marie-Claude Smouts, *Les organisations internationales* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995).

²¹ For a useful discussion of this methodological issue in terms of trans-national networks see Sandrine Kott, “Les organisations internationales, terrains d’étude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique,” *Critique internationale* 3 (2011): 9-16 and Sandrine Kott, “Une “communauté épistémique” du social? Experts de l’OIT et internationalisation des politiques sociales dans l’entre-deux-guerres,” *Genèses* 71 (2008): 26-46.

²² We thank Meredith Terretta for making this point to us. See Meredith Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World’: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa's Decolonization,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 34 (2012): 329-360 and the chapter from José Antonio Sánchez Román in this volume.

²³ Leo Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, *War and Peace, 1914-29* (London: Hutchinson, 1953), 332 quoted in Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 6.

²⁴ G. John Ikenberry, “Why Export Democracy? The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign Policy” *The Wilson Quarterly* 23 (1999): 56-65; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). For a contrasting view within the discipline of international relations see for example Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

²⁵ James and Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War*, 5.

²⁶ Lori Allen, *The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of Nations,” *Journal of Global History* 7 (2012): 233-56; Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c.1918-45* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Yann Decorzant, *La Société des Nations et la naissance d’une conception de la régulation économique internationale* (Bruxelles: P. Lang, 2011).

²⁷ Although certainly the League of Nations struggled and often failed to translate petitions sent to it in Arabic and Armenian, partly out of suspicion of those translators available in Geneva.

²⁸ Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled,’” 331.

²⁹ See also on this issue Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).

³⁰ For the notion of a force field see Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 5.

³¹ David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge, M.A., Cambridge University Press, 2013).

³² Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*. See also Yann Decorzant, “La Société des Nations et l'apparition d'un nouveau réseau d'expertise économique et financière (1914-1923),” *Critique internationale* 3, 52 (2011): 35-50.

³³ We are grateful for Susan Pedersen's comments on these analytical axes.

³⁴ On disarmament see Andrew Webster, “The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism,” in Sluga and Clavin, *Internationalism*, 139-169.

³⁵ Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 9. On health policy see usefully Clifford Rosenberg, “The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers,” *American Historical Review* 117 (2012): 671-697. See also Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation, 1921–1946* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang 2009); Martin David Dubin, “The League of Nations Health Organisation,” in Paul Weindling, (ed.), *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 56–80. On social policy at the LON see Magaly Rodriguez Garcia, Liat Kozma and Davide Rodogno (eds.), *The League of Nations Work on Social Issues: Visions, Endeavours and Experiments* (New York: United Nations Publications Office, 2015). Our thanks to the editors of the latter volume for their collegial collaboration as we prepared this book.

³⁶ Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*; Jamie Martin, *Experts of the World Economy: European Stabilization and the Transformation of Global Capitalism in the Era of Total War* (Cambridge; Mass; Harvard University Press, Forthcoming).

³⁷ On Du Bois in context across League and UN see groundbreaking work by Ananda Burra, “‘Petitioning the Mandates’: Anticolonial and Antiracist Publics in International Law,” (PhD diss., in progress, University of Michigan).

³⁸ See in this context on Europe, Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press: 2008).

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⁴² Aurélie Élika Gfeller, "The Authenticity of Heritage: Global Norm-Making at the Crossroads of Cultures," *American Historical Review* 122, no. 3 (2017), 759, 788.

⁴³ Antoine Prost and Jay M. Winter, *René Cassin et les droits de l'homme: le projet d'une génération* (Paris: Fayard, 2011).

⁴⁴ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012). See also Mark Philip Bradley, "Approaching the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, ed. Akira Iriye et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 327-44.

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⁴⁸ J.M. Yepes, *Le nouveau panaméricanisme et la seconde guerre mondiale (extrait de la Revue Générale du Droit International Public 1946* (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1946), 104. See also Arnulf Becker Lorca, *Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 338.

⁴⁹ Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” *International Organization* 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–597, cited in Gfeller, “The Authenticity of Heritage”, 759.

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⁵¹ See Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

⁵² See Mazower, *Governing the World*; Dan Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁵³ On Biafra see Bradley Simpson, “The Biafran Secession and the Limits of Self-Determination,” *Journal of Genocide Studies* 17 (2014): 377–354; Dirk Moses and Lasse Heerten, “The Nigeria-Biafra War: Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide, 1967-1970,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 16 (2014): 169-204.

⁵⁴ Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Jaci Eisenberg, “The Status of Women: A Bridge from the League of Nations to the United Nations,” *Journal of International Studies* 4 (2013): 9-24; Carol Miller, “Geneva – the Key to Equality: Inter-war Feminists and the League of Nations,” *Women’s History Review* 3 (1994): 219-245; Susan Pedersen, “Metaphors of the Schoolroom: Women Working the Mandates System at the League of Nations,” *History Workshop Journal* 66 (2008): 188-207.

⁵⁵ For an account focusing on a typology of internationalism beyond the LON and UN see Clavin and Sluga, *Histories of Internationalism*. For a new account of mid-century globalism see Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950* (Princeton; NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017): 1-23.

⁵⁶ See also Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).

⁵⁷ Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 87.